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An STPA-based analysis of Automated Driving Systems fleet maintenance activities

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#### **Overview and Outline**

- Introduction: Automated Driving Systems in Mobility as a Service.
- Inspection and Maintenance Activities in Fleet Operations.
- Using System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) for Fleet Operations.
- Safety Hazards & Operational Safety Responsibilities Identification.
- Summary & Conclusions







# SAE Level 4 Autonomous Driving Systems (ADS) in Mobility as a Service (MaaS)

- Mobility as a Service (MaaS) integrates various forms of transport and transport-related services into a single, comprehensive, and ondemand mobility service [1,2].
- Waymo, Cruise & Zoox, are some companies involved in MaaS.







Y. Z. Wong, D. A. Hensher, and C. Mulley, "Mobility as a service (MaaS): Charting a future context".
 A. Polydoropoulou, I. Pagoni, and A. Tsirimpa, "Ready for Mobility as a Service? Insights from stakeholders and end-users".

L4: SAE Level 4 ADS: Automated Driving System



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## Operational Safety: Maintenance & Inspection activities are usually overlooked

- Operational Safety goes beyond functional safety.
- Inspection and maintenance activities play a critical supporting role in large-scale fleet operations.
- Effects of latent failures on system safety – increase likelihood or severity of developing hazards.
- In ADS fleets: Software updates, instrument calibration & repairs can become a defining element in the partnership of ADS developers and fleet operators.

#### **Operational Aspects**

- Operational Design Domain (ODD)
- Dispatching & planning
- Health & status monitoring
- Inspection, maintenance, & repair
- Incident response, investigation, & reporting
- Crew staffing & training
- Passenger communication & safety

Structured approach to design inspection and maintenance operations – define tasks, responsibilities and resources required.

[3] G. Kumar, A. T. James, K. Choudhary, R. Sahai, and W. K. Song, "Investigation and analysis of implementation challenges for autonomous vehicles in developing countries using hybrid structural modeling,"



#### Agent and Operational Phase Breakdown

Inspection / Maintenance	• Performed by Maintenance Operation Center	<ul> <li>Performs DDT in established ODD</li> <li>Transmits information to FOC</li> <li>Detects and executes DDT fallback</li> <li>Performs self- diagnostics</li> </ul>	tics
On Route Without Passengers	• Performed by ADS Vehicle and Fleet Ops Center	surroundings vehicle Dispatching, trip assistance and safety commands Passenger Support Maintenace	
On Route With Passengers	• Performed by ADS Vehicle and Fleet Ops Center	Mobility as a and inspection Service Operation	and inspection
Pickup / Dropoff	• Performed by ADS Vehicle	Fleet Operations Center • Supervises fleet commands	
Post-Incident	• Performed by ADS Vehicle and Fleet Ops Center	<ul> <li>Intervenes when necessary (waypoints, command to fallback)</li> <li>Supports passengers</li> <li>Initiates post-incident</li> </ul>	1111

[4] Camila Correa-Jullian, John McCullough, Marilia Ramos, Jiaqi Ma, Enrique Lopez Droguett, and Ali Mosleh. "Modeling Fleet Operations of Autonomous Driving Systems in Mobility as a Service for Safety Risk Analysis" (ESREL 2022), "Safety Hazard Identification for Autonomous Driving Systems Fleet Operations in Mobility as a Service" (PSAM 16).



### System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)

- Roots in systems & control theory and System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP).
- Methodology:
  - Define the system, stakeholders, loss scenarios, system boundaries, system-level hazards, and systemlevel constraints.
  - Develop the hierarchical control structure diagram.
  - Identify UCAs that may breach the system-level constraints.
  - Identify the corresponding loss scenarios resulting from the UCA.

Method focused on analyzing Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) and their effect on system-level safety.



[3] Leveson, N. and Thomas, J. (2018) STPA Handbook.



## System Modeling: System-level Losses (L), Hazards (H) and Safety Constraints (SC)

L-1: Injury or loss of life of passengers or other road users.

L-2: Vehicle damage due to collision with objects.

L-3: Loss of vehicle connection.

L-4: Loss of mission.

L-5: Vehicle is stranded.

L-6: Loss of reputation.

H-1: Vehicle does not execute DDT correctly.

H-2: Vehicle suffers a safety-critical failure.

H-3: Vehicle breaches established ODD.

H-4: FOC does not intervene when required.

H-5: MOC clears the vehicle for operation incorrectly.

SC-1: Vehicle must execute DDT correctly under the conditions specified in the ODD.

SC-2: Fleet operators must minimize the risk of safety-critical failures through adequate inspection and maintenance procedures

SC-3: Vehicle must implement adequate DDT procedures to remain within the specified ODD and perform DDT fallback strategies if necessary.

SC-4: Fleet operators must monitor and supervise the vehicle and intervene to support the vehicle operation.

SC-5: Fleet operators must establish maintenance and inspection procedures in coordination with the ADS developer and ensure these are followed.











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#### Safety Hazards & Responsibilities

- High-level safety hazards characterized by over 75 different failure modes.
- The Maintenance Operations Center crew fail to:
  - Recover a missing vehicle.
  - Schedule inspection and maintenance activities.
  - Perform the inspection and maintenance correctly.
  - □ Follow vehicle clearance procedures.
  - Perform low-complexity maintenance.
  - Request external maintenance support.
  - Correctly implement operational procedure updates.
  - Report system anomalies to ADS developer.
  - Coordinate system updates with ADS developer.

To ensure operational safety human and organizational factors in procedure & system designed need to be addressed

Challenge to quantify effect of latent failures – but approach may provide good insight to design safety barriers.

Further discussion is needed on what will be required from the ADS developers – what information, training, or supervision will be provided to the fleet developers.



#### Summary & Conclusion

- Inspection & maintenance activities will play an important role in ADS fleet operations.
- Effective hazard identification methods are required to construct safe & robust system of systems.
- STPA provides focus to unintended consequences and emerging behaviors.
- Opportunities to leverage method to detect need for operational & maintenance procedures.









### Next Steps and Future Work

Next steps:

- [Under revision] Development of comprehensive hazard identification methodology for complex socio-technical systems.
- The authors are conducting stakeholder validation activities in the context of Level 4 ADS Fleet Operations as Mobility as a Service.
- From these results, further work may be focused on deriving the requirements (e.g., tools, training, etc.) each agent requires to perform their safetyrelated tasks.

#### Expected impact:

- Model interactions between ADS-equipped vehicle and human operators to ensure operational safety.
- Inform of key responsibilities and risk mitigation activities of fleet operators.





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